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Studies and researches regarding the 
urban policies impact on land valuation
The authors develop a concept paper on the economic valuation of 
land. They detail the basic principles corroborated with the direct fac-
tors that modify the mathematical parameters and also the impact of 
construction on the land. Starting from the principles of Darin Drab-
kin, the authors develop, within the concept of a market economy, an 
urban land sale procedure by optimizing the control of land instru-
ments. This study asks about the expected consequences of increas-
ing the tax rate on the land component of real estate while reducing 
the rate at which the improvement is taxed. The first part briefly pre-
sents the consequences that land taxes are expected to produce given 
our theoretical understanding of land markets. These conclusions are 
blind to the planning and the institutional context of the development 
process. The consequences of moving from a general property tax to a 
land value tax in the Toronto and Ottawa regions are assessed by inter-
viewing developers, planners and municipal finance officers. The con-
clusions summarise the main concerns that would be raised by mov-
ing toward land value taxation in the context of a growth management 
strategy that would make cities more compact.
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1. Methods
Land taxation policies have been used in some parts of the USA, Australia, 
Denmark, Syria, and Spain with the intention of stimulating development and in-
creasing the intensity of urban land use (Lichfield and Darin-Drabkin 1980). The 
tilting of tax rates to place a greater burden on the land portion of real estate has 
also been used in Western Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and Jamaica to 
promote development. National land taxes in Japan were introduced to reduce 
speculation, stabilise land prices, and improve the efficiency of land use. Land tax-
es in Korea were intended to penalise the owners of under used land and combat 
monopolistic land accumulation (Youngman and Malme 1994). Indeed, Lichfield 
and Darin-Drabkin (1980: 92) describe the land value tax as “one of the oldest of 
the proposed remedies of the ills inherent in the urban land market”. 
2. Results 
The expected consequences of taxing land rather than real property are sum-
marised in the literature review by Skaburskis (1995). The move toward land val-
ue taxation can affect the substitution of capital for land in the production of real 
estate services, the accumulation of non-land capital within the economy, and the 
timing of development. The tax may induce regressive income redistributions as 
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old buildings are replaced earlier than they would if a more neutral tax was used 
to finance local services.
The Substitution Effects and Density
The traditional assessment of the general property tax separates the tax base 
into a land and a building component. Netzer (1966: 204) points to the neutrality 
of a tax on the land portion of real estate, “since no possible response to the tax 
can ... improve the situation, assuming that landowners have been making maxi-
mum use of their sites prior to the imposition of the tax”. The tax on improve-
ments, however, distorts the returns a property owner can gain from the building 
relative to the returns that can be gained from alternative investments. The tax on 
improvements to land raises the perceived cost of buildings and the owner can 
reduce the tax burden by designing projects that use relatively more land in com-
parison to improvements. This leads to lower than optimum densities and forces 
the city to spread more than it would had a perfectly neutral tax been used to 
finance local services and infrastructure. By placing much smaller burdens on the 
owners of vacant land, the property tax encourages owners of under-developed 
land to hold it in this state for longer periods of time. 
The analysis of the substitution effects by Brueckner (1986) shows that reduc-
ing the tax on improvements and increasing it on land within a part of a region 
can, in some cases, increase development activity and the demand for land by 
builders. The net effect of the increase in the tax rate on land, coupled with a rev-
enue equalising decline in the rate on improvements, can lead to an increase in 
land values when the policy is applied to a small part of an urban region. The 
surprising implication of the analysis is that the positive effects of the lower im-
provements tax dominates, so that gradation gradation: see ablaut.  unambiguous-
ly raises the value of land (Brueckner 1986). 
This conclusion departs from the traditional view by showing that land prices 
are not always lowered by land value taxes. When the land value tax is applied 
in a small part of the housing market and the overall supply of housing in the 
region is unchanged, the policy can attract development activity to the area that 
exempts the tax on improvements. A land value tax implemented in a special dis-
trict can increase development activity in that district, raise the density of new de-
velopment and raise the price of land. The instrument may, therefore, be an ideal 
method for recovering the cost of major infrastructure investments such as transit 
lines and stations as it stimulates the early development that is needed to take ad-
vantage of the infrastructure investment.
Capital Accumulation Effects and Housing Prices 
The “new” analysis of the possible effects of a tax on land value follows two 
strands. One considers the effect of the tax on savings and capital accumulation 
while the other focuses on its effect on the profit maximizing timing of develop-
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ment. Feldstein’s (1977) article points to the indirect consequences of land taxes 
on investment behavior. Since the tax on land reduces the value of land, investors 
end up placing a larger part of their savings in the produced capital, such as, the 
“non-land” capital. The resulting increase in the country’s capital stock changes 
the capital/land ratios at equilibrium causing the productivity of land to increase. 
As a result of the land value tax, “the price of land does not fall as much as the 
traditional theory predicts” (Feldstein 1977: 351). Follain and Miyake (1986) ex-
pand the general equilibrium analysis and show that the move to a land value tax 
in an open economy increases the investment in improvements that would even-
tually lower housing prices. The indirect effect of a tax on land increases the pro-
pensity to invest in the capital placed on land and this should lead to an overall 
increase in the intensity of land use. 
Timing Effects and Density   
The second branch of the new theory considers the effect of taxes on develop-
ment timing and project density (Arnott and Lewis 1979). The move toward land 
value taxation may affect the timing of development decisions as pointed out by 
Bentick (1979), Mills (1981), Wildasin (1982), Tideman (1982), Evans (1982), An-
derson (1986), and Arnott (1996). The tax on land value, as defined by the pres-
ent value of the future rents that will be gained from the developed real-estate 
will penalise most the land that is best left for later development and, thereby, 
favours the earlier development of vacant land. By hurrying the development of 
land, the tax favours lower density projects in growing cities by increasing most 
the burdens on the land that is best left for later development. Delays would lead 
to development decisions being made in the context of higher land values which 
would result in higher density projects. The land value tax is, therefore, expected 
to make cities more compact over the medium term by reducing the amount of 
underused land within the city. In the long run all new development would have 
lower densities than would be the case with a tax that delays development. How-
ever, in comparison with general property taxes, the timing effect is not expected 
to fully offset the substitution effect that leads to lower densities. The net effect 
of a shift from a general property tax to a land value tax is an increase in density. 
A lively debate has ensued in the literature regarding the effect of the definition 
of the land value tax base on profit maximizing development decisions and the 
consequences of changing the definition (Skaburskis 1995). A tax on a general as-
sessment of the best use of the land that is defined in ways that are independent 
of its actual or prospective use was thought to avoid the timing distortions that 
can reduce project densities. A “standard value” for the land in a part of the urban 
region would be defined without reference to the particular characteristics of indi-
vidual sites so as to avoid variations in the land value tax that reflect differences 
in the capitalized value of the prospective buildings that might be placed on the 
land (Vickery 1982). The standard value would ensure that the owners of lots that 
are best left for later development, hence more dense development yielding high-
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er rents per square meter of land, are not assessed at a higher value and penalized 
relative to the owners of lots that are to be developed soon. Wildasin (1982), how-
ever, shows that land taxes would be neutral, non distortionary with regard to the 
timing of development, only if subsidies were paid to projects yielding current net 
losses. Arnott (1996), in the most comprehensive analysis of both the timing and 
density effects of land and property taxes, shows that the only neutral tax policy 
would have different tax rates on pre-development land rent, post-development 
site value, and post-development structural value. Furthermore, Arnott’s conclu-
sion suggests that the tax policy, that would leave development decisions undis-
torted, would tax the land under the building while subsidising the built com-
ponent. The subsidy would increase with density when building quality is held 
constant. In summary, the expected consequence of the move toward land value 
taxation is the increase in density through the substitution effect and the reduc-
tion in the propensity of landowners to hold vacant or underused land. A spatial-
ly limited move toward land value taxation, as in a special assessment district, is 
expected to increase project density and speed up development activity. The quest 
for a perfectly neutral tax with regard to density and timing is expected to be im-
practical and, perhaps, not desirable. 
Induced Redistribution Consequences   
The immediate redistribution consequences of a move toward land value taxa-
tion would be the shift of tax burdens from owners of well built out property to 
the owners of underused or vacant inner city land. In the long run the land tax 
would reduce burdens on the developers and eventual owners of property that 
exploit fully the advantages of a site and increase burdens on the other own-
ers. The fairness of these redistribution consequences may be questioned on the 
grounds that the owners of underused land may have paid a price that reflects 
the future value of the land under the current tax regime and would suffer finan-
cial losses while waiting for their development opportunities to emerge. Develop-
ers may also be penalized for land banking and land assembly can become dif-
ficult if the tax burdens are not fully capitalized back into lower land prices. These 
redistribution consequences may affect landowners and developers differently at 
different points in time but the extent to which they lead to a more efficient spa-
tial structure, lower infrastructure and municipal service costs, and an overall re-
duction of the tax burden on real estate, the land value tax can be expected to 
benefit most property owners in the long run. The transition period, however, 
would be difficult. The early removal of old buildings that do not make the best 
use of sites that are zoned for higher intensity uses advances land use efficiency 
goals but creates regressive redistribution consequences across tenant groups. By 
increasing the holding costs of property, the land value tax may cause the early 
demolition of low priced housing and commercial floor space, reduce the supply 
of low priced space and, thereby, harm low income renters and marginal business-
es. The new additions and the space offered in the commercial development may 
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increase filtering rates to counter the immediate regressive impacts in the long 
run. However, the land value tax may not be as harmful to lower income rent-
ers when compared to the general property tax that encourages owners to demol-
ish their older low rent buildings to reduce tax burdens and leave the sites vacant 
while waiting for development opportunities to ripen. 
The net redistribution effect of a move toward land value taxation, due to the 
change in development timing, is unclear. 
The Interview Method 
The review of the theoretical literature suggested that a land value tax could 
be designed and implemented in such a way as to increase building activity, in-
crease densities and reduce the tendency to hold vacant land in urban areas. 
However, the review of the empirical literature on land value taxation by Skabur-
skis (1995) does not yield conclusive results. The empirical studies of the Austra-
lian experience tend to reinforce the research worker’s prior views. The analysis 
of the Pittsburgh experience is made difficult by the many other policies that were 
used in conjunction with the tax rate tilt to encourage the redevelopment of the 
city’s downtown. The council’s pro-development stance, for example, may have 
been more important than the tilt in tax rates. The failure of past research to em-
pirically demonstrate the effects of land value taxes on development activity re-
flects the broad range of factors that simultaneously affect development and cloud 
the efforts to view the consequences of tax policy on urban form and regional de-
velopment. Taxes are but one of many factors and their consequence may be too 
faint to observe through the noise created by the other factors affecting develop-
ment in any one region. Cross-sectional studies may be inconclusive due to the 
many other factors that affect development and that can not be controlled for in 
empirical work. And finally, property and land taxes may just play too small a role 
in development decisions to create observable consequences.
This study recognizes that formal econometric methods are unlikely at this 
time to reveal the impacts of property or land taxation policy and attempts to ap-
proach questions regarding the consequences of land value taxation by asking de-
velopers, planners and local finance officers in the Toronto and Ottawa regions 
for their reactions and thoughts. The validity of this research approach is depen-
dent on the belief that informed people can assess the impact of policy changes by 
drawing on their detailed knowledge of local conditions and on their past experi-
ence with development activity. At the very least, this research approach can iden-
tify the concerns that would be raised by the stakeholders in land development 
should land taxes be contemplated. The method can contribute to our understand-
ing of the possible side- and after-effects of the policy and it can help develop im-
plementation strategies. It is the best method for assessing the role of institutional 
and planning constraints on the possible consequences of land value taxation. 
Municipalities within each of the two study regions were chosen for detailed 
analysis based on the desire to assure a mix of central core, mature suburban, newly 
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suburbanized and rural municipalities. Within each municipality, officials were iden-
tified in the planning and in the finance or economic development departments. 
The most senior official available who was informed on the topic was interviewed. 
Developers were chosen to represent a range of firm sizes, development portfolios, 
and geographical scopes of activity within each region. A total of 69 interviews were 
carried out in the two regions to focus on the factors considered in development 
decisions on project density, timing, location and use mix. The land taxation topic 
was raised with 39 key informants and their comments are summarized here. The 
distribution of the respondents by occupation is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Occupation of the Key Informants.
Occupations of Key Informants     Ottawa Toronto Total
Finance Officials    6 6 12
Developers and Builders         7 9 16
City Planning Officials          5 6 11
Total                            18 21 39
The use of interviews to gain information on the impacts of contemplated poli-
cy changes on urban development trends is problematic for several reasons. People 
are expected to offer self-serving answers. Interviewees may not be aware of the 
consequences of taxes on urban form or they may be unable to predict their own 
reactions to hypothetical changes in future policy. Their actual behaviour may be 
different from their stated behaviour and their opinions may therefore not reflect 
the actual consequences of changes in the tax policy. In addition to these difficul-
ties are problems that may be created by the respondent’s adverse reactions to the 
hardships induced by the transition to a new regime. George Break (1973) used 
to say that “an old tax is a good tax” because its burdens have been either capi-
talized or people have become used to new patterns of choice and behaviour. We 
anticipate these problems and have tried to adopt appropriate counter-measures. 
To some extent the problems are reduced by our interviewing municipal planners 
and finance officers who have different interests from developers. Furthermore, we 
made an effort to interview developers in different market sectors, such as, some 
with large land holdings and some who do not bank land, some involved in green-
field development and some more closely associated with infill development, some 
engaged in exclusively low density tract housing development and some also in-
volved in higher density condominium or rental development. 
The Developers’ Views
The notion of land value taxation was unfamiliar to most of the 16 develop-
ers asked about land taxation; only four had heard of the concept. The other 12 
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required an explanation before they could begin answering questions about its po-
tential impact. Ten out of thirteen developers that expressed an opinion thought 
that a tilt in tax rates would make raw land less attractive to purchase and de-
velop and would reduce the value of vacant land. The degree to which land 
prices were reduced was seen to depend on the length of the approvals process 
because this determines how long the developer has to pay the higher taxes be-
fore the land can begin generating revenue. Reduced land values would in prin-
ciple have the effect of making land easier to assemble and the increased carrying 
costs would pressure owners to develop vacant land quickly. However, the devel-
opers we interviewed warned that a shift to land value taxation would play havoc 
with the existing development process and dampen development activity in the 
long run. Most significantly, seven developers observed that the market place and 
the planning process set the rate at which raw land is converted to urban uses. 
Property owners do not tend to hold land vacant while waiting for allowable 
densities to rise. Rather, they try to develop their lands at the earliest opportu-
nity. They develop when a market for the product is evident, when services are 
in place and when planning approvals have been obtained. These views of de-
velopment timing differ from the dynamic profit maximizing behavior described 
in the theoretical literature. By raising the costs of carrying vacant land, the shift 
to a land value tax would increase the risk associated with the holding of land for 
development. In the worst cases, land value taxation was seen by developers to 
produce bankruptcies and cause some of the landowners who were waiting for 
approvals to “walk away” from their properties. The increased pressure to obtain 
approvals for immediate development would inundate planning departments and 
the appeals court as landowners, panicked by the announcement of the tax, try to 
rush their developments through. The land value tax would discourage large-scale 
land development and force developers into an inefficient process of purchasing 
small parcels of land only after they were convinced the market could absorb the 
product. This would tend to counteract the expected impact of lower land prices 
on the assembly of land. Not only would the development process become less 
efficient, it would be less fair than the current property tax system, undermining 
political support for the policy. The combination of high carrying costs and higher 
legal costs would favor larger developers and eliminate the mid-sized players. The 
reduction in land values would penalize the original landowners, often farmers 
whose operations on the urban fringe are already financially marginal. Some in-
terviewees claimed that the higher carrying cost of land and the disruption of the 
development process would result in higher housing prices that would prevent 
lower income households from entering the homeownership market. A land value 
tax was thought to be inequitable because vacant land with no source of revenue 
would be taxed at the same rate as built-out land that generates a revenue stream. 
This would be a significant change from the existing principle that taxes should 
be linked to the demand a landowner makes on public services. The land value 
tax was seen by some respondents as a subsidy to the owners of already devel-
oped lots. One developer dismissed the idea of a tax designed to capture increases 
in land values on the grounds that they are already paying for the infrastructure 
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that enhances land values through high development cost charges. Developers 
did not recognize the social costs of keeping serviced land vacant. 
The impact of a land value tax on development densities was also explored. 
Of the eight developers who offered firm opinions on the density impacts of a tilt 
in tax rates, six predicted that the change would increase project densities while 
two thought it would leave densities unchanged. Four residential developers 
thought that a land value tax would encourage the intensification of urban land 
use. They reasoned that if a land value tax has the effect of increasing the car-
rying cost of vacant land and reducing the cost of developed land, then devel-
opers would want to seek approval on the end use that had the highest value. 
This is entirely in line with the theoretical conclusions. However, this view was 
contradicted by two residential developers who claimed that market factors were 
of overwhelming importance and that taxes would not affect their choice of hous-
ing mix, hence their choice of density. Two commercial developers observed that 
a land value tax might reduce demolitions of under-tenanted buildings and leave 
the space on the market at a lower rent. 
Even the developers who agreed that a land value tax might discourage spec-
ulation in vacant land and the demolition of existing structures and encourage 
higher density uses, thought that the tax would constitute an unjustifiable inter-
vention into the property market and would distort the development process in 
highly destructive ways. They also thought that the rationale for a land value tax 
rests on the erroneous assumption that developers are in control of the land de-
velopment process, that developers hold vacant land until it suits them to devel-
op. The respondents saw themselves as being more passive actors reacting to mar-
kets and to the development approvals process. They build when the market for 
their product becomes apparent, not when they think that their long run profits 
are maximized. None of the developers would hold back on a financially feasible 
development because they thought that higher densities in the future might yield 
higher profits. The respondents uniformly favored the market value assessment 
of both land and improvements and thought that this was the fairest and most 
administratively efficient basis for local taxation. Where distortions were acknowl-
edged, modifications to the market value system would be better than a wholesale 
shift towards land value taxes. For instance, one person noted that commercial de-
molitions could be prevented by using a graded property tax proportional to oc-
cupancy. In other words, demolitions could be prevented by charging lower, not 
higher, taxes on underused land. As expected, developers favor tax reductions. 
Although some of the officials who expressed an opinion believed that a land 
value tax would provide an incentive for developing vacant land within built-up 
areas, they pointed out that this was only one factor determining the timing of 
land redevelopment. Officials in the central cities noted that most vacant land is 
unoccupied because it is zoned for industrial use (with councils reluctant to re-
zone for fiscal reasons) and soil contamination makes redevelopment of industrial 
land uneconomical. Some officials worried that the pressures for increased density 
created by a land value tax could result in “concrete canyons” and reduced urban 
vitality. They pointed out that many residents oppose high-density development 
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because of the associated increase in congestion of local services and amenities 
and because of the change that higher densities will bring to the social character 
of their neighborhoods. 
However the officials, like the developers, were not sure that reduced land 
prices would make land easier to assemble as the higher taxes would make it 
harder to carry large land parcels and would encourage developers to phase 
their projects. Although the municipal officials generally agreed that the property 
owners in their cities did not routinely engage in speculation, they believed that 
a land value tax would reduce the small amount of speculative activity that was 
taking place. In terms of side-effects, the officials were concerned about the im-
pact of a tilt in tax rates on residential neighborhoods and municipal revenues. 
A land value tax would be more volatile than the current tax regime because of 
the tendency for land values to fluctuate considerably from year to year. When 
zoning allows higher densities, the move to a land value tax would lead to sharp 
tax increases on low-density residential properties in the core areas which until 
now have been protected by shifting some of the tax burden to industrial and 
commercial uses and disrupt long established neighborhoods. Although munici-
pal officials were less concerned than developers with potential bankruptcies due 
to higher carrying costs, concern was expressed that municipalities could be left 
with unpaid taxes if developers walked away from their land holdings as a result 
of the change in tax policy. Finally, central city planners were concerned by the 
fact that the land base is largely outside the core area and that a land value tax 
would ignore the major asset of central cities, namely the capital embedded in the 
built form. Central city planners were more supportive of land value taxation if 
it were to be applied on a region-wide basis with a pooled assessment base. Mu-
nicipal officials expressed the view that land value taxation was politically unten-
able because of the dramatic shifts of tax burden during the transition period and 
because of the lack of correspondence between the tax assessment and the rev-
enue potential of the property. However, if applied in specific districts rather than 
across the region, a land value tax could be politically acceptable. The land val-
ue capture tax (also called “benefits sharing tax” by the province, or “betterment 
levy” elsewhere) was considered attractive because it would be more closely tied 
to benefits derived by developers, while the municipality would recover a portion 
of the value increase that results from public investment. 
Because of the mismatch between the development pressures created by a 
land value tax and existing institutional and cultural conditions, both the develop-
ers and planners agreed that the tax would be unfair and would make the devel-
opment process less efficient. In the core areas, the redistribution of the tax bur-
den towards older residential areas of the city was seen to be unfair as owners of 
lower valued property would be asked to pay more taxes. The tax would generate 
conflicts over density issues, lead to volatility in assessments, and create spatial re-
distribution flowing from the fact that the largest part of the taxable land base is 
seen to be in the suburbs, not in the central cities. Individual respondents sug-
gested ways of handling these side effects. For instance, financial officials in the 
central cities suggested region-wide tax pooling as a way of maintaining the as-
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sessment base of central cities under a land value tax system. Municipal planners 
suggested that increased attention be given to zoning considerations as a way of 
controlling density changes. In the peripheral areas, the problems include finan-
cial penalties on farmers, bankruptcies of smaller development firms, and an in-
crease of development pressures in areas not yet “ripe” for development. If taxes 
are raised on “underused” peripheral lands, then owners will rush to expand the 
suburbs and increase the spread the urban region. Some officials thought that the 
problems could be addressed by stricter planning controls and improved staging 
of infrastructure investments. Arnott (1996) has suggested that it would be ap-
propriate to exempt the peripheral land from property taxes until after the land 
is ready for development. This would require extreme sensitivity on the part of 
planners to designate land for urban development as the market for different 
building types expands. A fundamental concern of both developers and munici-
pal officials in both mature and newly developing areas was that a land value tax 
is not linked to revenue potential. The land value tax does not score well on the 
“ability to pay” principle. A land value capture tax applied in discrete areas of the 
region where major public investments were being planned was suggested as an 
antidote to this concern and as an alternative to a broad based tax to correct for 
the distortions induced by general property taxes. When land value taxes are lim-
ited to specific sectors receiving infrastructure investments that are not covered by 
development cost charges, the policy can raise land values by channeling develop-
ment to that sector. 
3. Conclusions
The interviews generally confirm the main expectations developed by refer-
ence to theory: 
• Land value taxes would speed up development. 
• They would lead to more intense land use. 
• They would reduce speculation. 
Arguments against the land value tax include the unfairness claim due to the 
tax not reflecting the property’s revenue potential. The two cities do not have 
the problem with vacant lots and the tax would increase inner-city development 
without the destruction of existing low rent buildings. Arguments regarding the 
unimportance of taxes in the development decision making process appear to be 
unfounded as the interviews could raise animated discussions on the harm that 
could be created by land value taxes such as, drive out the small developers, raise 
housing prices and exclude lower income households from the housing market all 
serious matters for public concern, all impacts that developers have attributed in 
the past to public policies that threaten their cash flows and possible profits. Ei-
ther the developers were simply reacting to “unknown devils” or they could fore-
see the tax as having a real impact on their decisions. Efficiency concerns are also 
raised: More density may not be wanted in the inner city, smaller developers may, 
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in fact, be driven out of business by higher carrying costs and the development 
industry may become less competitive; staged development would be encouraged 
if the tax burdens are not fully capitalized back into land values and smaller scale 
projects may, in some cases, be less efficient than larger scale comprehensive proj-
ects; the transition period would create bottlenecks in current approvals processes 
and delays would become more onerous for a period of time; the rush to rede-
velopment in some parts of the city induced by the “announcement effect” of the 
policy would raise NIMBY concerns that would generate opposition to the policy. 
A serious concern is raised by the possible spatial redistribution effects that 
would be brought about by a move to land value taxation. Inner city planners and 
finance officers believe that, because the largest amount of land is at the periph-
ery of the city, the largest share of the tax base is in the suburban municipalities. 
Developers are most concerned about the increased cost of holding raw land dur-
ing assembly or for future development. Arnott (1996) shows why the land at the 
periphery should not be taxed and justifies the exemption of agricultural land. 
Several policy-related conclusions follow:
• the land value tax should be applied within a designated urban boundary and 
not on raw or farmed land in the path of urban expansion. Taxing the land out-
side the urban boundary would increase the spread of the city by increasing the 
pressure for early development. The holding of land at the periphery by long 
term investors increases its price, which leads to higher density development 
and advances urban containment goals provided that leapfrog development is 
prevented. 
• Land value taxes, coupled with tight designations of development sectors, can 
make cities more compact, but market conditions do not always evolving as 
planners assume. Delays in development may leave landowners with large tax 
burdens that are not supported by revenues. Thus, a land value tax may be a 
means of shifting to the owners of land a larger share of the costs attributable to 
market uncertainly. 
The exclusion of raw land outside the development zones from the tax base 
means that almost all of the tax base is in the built-up part of the city and that the 
tax burdens placed on the owners of underused property in the inner city will be 
large. Assessment difficulties will be created by the dependence of the assessed 
land value on planning decisions. In the inner city, the size of the tax obligations 
will depend on the appraiser ’s views regarding city growth, which may be af-
fected by growth management plans and by the neighborhood’s redevelopment 
potential as determined by markets and land use controls. The distribution of tax 
burdens in the periphery will depend on the city planner’s designation of the de-
velopment sectors, on their location, extent, and timing. Whether or not the antici-
pated difficulties and their associated legal costs mean that land value taxation is 
not worth considering depends on the severity of the problems that are generated 
by current growth patterns. 
The implementation of a land value tax, in conjunction with the designation 
of development sectors, requires the close coordination between public sector 
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planning agencies and private sector development companies. If larger developers 
are able to deal more effectively with city planning departments than small devel-
opers, then equity and efficiency issues are raised. 
The prospect of a sudden increase in tax obligations will make property own-
ers want the designation of development sectors delayed until development is im-
minent. This will reduce the amount of land available for development at any one 
point in time and run counter to the goals the Province of Ontario had when in-
sisting that municipalities keep a ten-year supply of land zoned for conversion to 
urban use and that a part of it be left for low-priced housing. Urban containment 
policies - whether they are tax policies or regulations - that do not explicitly ad-
dress housing affordability problems, are regressive. 
A land value tax may meet with NIMBY resistance because of its association 
with increased development densities. If this response leads to planning regula-
tions that prevent higher densities, the rationale for implementing a land value is 
defeated. Fears about neighborhood destruction could be intensified if the sudden 
switch to a land value tax leads to a rush by owners, trying to avoid the new tax 
burdens, to redevelop their properties. 
The implementation of land value taxation may create more short-term prob-
lems than the policy is expected to resolve. Site-value taxation may be superior 
to the present system of real property taxation, any conversion to such a scheme 
for local taxation in Canada would undoubtedly impose severe transitional costs 
on certain groups or individuals leading to unforeseen windfall gains or losses. 
For this reason and because there are not reliable estimates regarding the value 
of either the benefits of site taxation or the cost of making this change it would be 
quite unwise to consider seriously such a transition at this particular time”.
Given the difficulties, are there any conditions that would make land value 
taxation worth considering? Possibly two. 
1. Municipal or regional growth management. It appears that land value taxes 
will increase densities, speed up development and penalize the owners of un-
derused urban land. They can, therefore, have a place within the pallet of in-
struments used in comprehensive growth management. But whether or not 
a growth management policy is effectively implemented will depend on the 
willingness of municipal councils in the region and the general public to bear 
its costs. (2) When the public does not recognize, and is not seriously con-
cerned about, impending growth-related problems, as appears to be the case 
in Toronto and Ottawa at this time, the implementation of land value taxation 
may create more trouble than it is worth. In the absence of a strong consensus 
in favor of growth management, a series of tilts in the tax rates that gradu-
ally increases the burdens placed on land while reducing them on buildings 
will help reduce urban sprawl while avoiding the problems created by the an-
nouncement of a major change in tax policy. 
2. Special service districts. The use of land value taxes in special districts to cover 
the cost of extraordinary infrastructure investments such as subway lines and 
stations would speed up the development that is needed to justify the invest-
ment, increase the density of development and thereby the number of users 
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of the services being constructed, and spread some of the risk associated with 
the public sector’s investment to the primary beneficiaries in the private sec-
tor. The land value tax could be introduced in the negotiations and consulta-
tions as an integral part of the infrastructure investment decision.
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